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DHAMMA KARUNARATNE 
CONSENT TO MEDICAL AND SURGICAL PROCEDURES 
CONSENT: 
Problems involving aspects of consent to medical and 
surgical procedures have become prominent in the field of medical-
legal cases. A physician may not lay hands on a patient without 
the patientls consent (express or implied.) The bases of relief 
in the medical and surgical cases are two: 
(a) negligence and 
(b) assault and battery. 
Thus a doctor who administers treatment or performs an operation 
upon a patient without the latterts consent or consent of someone 
able to give consent on patientts behalf, subject to certain 
exceptions, may become civilly liable either in an action for 
assault and battery or negligence. Also he may become 
criminally liable for assault and battery. The distinction 
Courts make between the two causes of action is that assault 
and battery is based on an intentional act, while negligence 
is based upon an unintentional act. These two causes of 
action are jointly present in many cases. Thus a plaintiff 
may jointly have a cause of action for assault and battery as 
well as for negligence resulting from the same operation and may 
sue on either ground. 
Any person suing a physician for assault and battery 
as opposed to negligent conduct need only show that treatment 
was given without authorisation and need not show any real 
damage. But in order to make out a case in negligence patient 
must show that he suffered actual damage as a result of the 
doctorls conduct. When a patient sues in battery he is 
entitled to nominal damages even though he cannot show any 
real damage. But when a patient has suffered actual damage 
or injury by reason of an unauthorised operation, he will be 
able to recover substantial damages even though the surgeon 
can show (a) that he performed the operation in good faith, 
(b) and that it was performed in the best interest 
of the patient, 
(c) and that the operation or treatment was carefully 
and skilfully carried out. 
Following cases will illustrate this point. In the Canadian 
case of Mulloy v Hop Sang (1935 1 WWR 714) the plaintiff 
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surgeon who had, on an examination of the plaintiff under 
anaesthetic, decided that an immediate operation was necessary 
to prevent blood poisoning, amputated the hand of the defendant 
which was badly injured due to an accident. The plaintiff, 
in these circumstances sued for the professional fees and the 
defendant denying he was liable counter claimed for damages for 
assault. Even though the Judge found that the operation was 
necessary and was performed in a highly satisfactory manner 
the Court awarded damages for trespass to person in respect of 
the unauthorized amputation which the patient expressly 
prohibited. 
In the American case of Hively v Higgs (1927 253 P 263) 
surgeon who operated on the septum of the patientts nose, removed 
her tonsils without her consent. The Court awarded substantial 
damages rejecting the argument that tonsils had no known useful 
purpose. Thus it is clear that it is no defence to an action 
in assault and battery that the unauthorized operation was performed 
with due skill and care and that it was performed in the best 
interests of the patiento 
There have been no decided cases in New Zealand Courts 
on consent in medical suits. This paper sets out to demonstrate 
the problems which may arise in this connection and to suggest 
possible solutions and reference will be made to American, 
Canadian and English cases to show how other legal systems have 
attempted to solve these medico-legal problems. 
(II) WHEN IS CONSENT UNNECESSARY? 
However there is one instance where consent is 
generally regarded as unnecessary, i.e. in cases of emergency 
or crisis situations. 
two ways 
These emergency cases usually arise in 
i) where a person has been rendered unconscious in 
an accident and a doctor is confronted with 
conditions which require immediate treatment in 
order to safeguard the life, limb and health of 
the patient and, 
ii) where a doctor is authorized by the patient to 
perform one course of treatment during which he 
discovers anu}ctnticipated emergency condition, 
unrelated to the first condition, which requirES 
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immediate attention. 
It is a well established rule in Canada and America 
that a doctor is justified in performing an operation or 
administering treatment without obtaining a patientls prior 
consent, where circumstances demand that action be taken before 
it is possible to obtain consent. It is unlikely that this 
principle will not be recognized in this country if ~point 
were to come up for decision before Courts. Following cases 
will illustrate the rules followed by Canadian and American 
Courts with regard to such emergencies. In the American case 
of Mehr v William (1905 104 N.W. 12) a doctor engaged to perform 
an operation up8R7of the plaintiffts ears, after anaesthetizing 
her and examining her ear found that the condition was not as 
serious as he supposed. However, he found a very serious 
condition in the other ear and proceeded to operate thereon. 
She was dissatisfied with the surgical result and brought an 
action for assault even though the operation was in every way 
successful and skilfully performed. The Court giving judgement 
for the plaintiff held that no danger to her life or health 
existed to bring the matter under the emergency doctrine and 
the operation was an infringement of the right of inwlability 
of person. 
In Franklyn v Peabody (228 N.W. 681) the plaintiff 
suffered from a stiff finger as a result of an injury. Her 
surgeon advised an operation to which she consented. When the 
finger was cut surgeon found an adhesion between the tendons 
and decision was made that best results could be obtained by 
enclosing the tendons in fascia. An incision in the plaintiffts 
thigh was made for the purpose of obtaining fascia lata with 
which he proceeded to sheath the tendon. Plaintiff who suffered 
from a muscle hernia as a result of this treatment brought an 
action for assault against the defendant. On appeal, it was 
held that no emergency existed sufficient to justify dispensing 
with plaintiffls consent. 
In the Canadian case of Murray v McMurc}y (1949 2 D.L.R. 
412) a surgeon performing a caesarean operation tied off the 
patientts fallopian tubes in order to preclude a second pregnancy, 
when he found tumours which he felt might be dangerous in the 
event of such pregnancy}iu... Surgeon was held liable for assault_ 
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The Court holding that there was no emergency immediately 
threatening the life or health of the patient pointed out that 
the fact that tumours might constitute a hazard in the event 
of future pregnancy was not a sufficient justification for 
taking such a drastic step without consent. But in Wheeler v 
Barker (92 Cal. app. 2d 776) a surgeon operating for a tumour 
found, upon opening the plaintiffls abdomen a large tumour and 
that he felt it was necessary to and did perform a subtotal 
hysterectomy removing the plaintiffls uterus, It was held that 
the defendant was justified. The Court said that consent need 
not have been obtained from the patient because the growth had 
increased from a small size to that of a lemon and unless checked 
at that point it would have greatly increased in size and would 
have been a threat to patientts life. 
In the Canadian case of Marshall v Curry (1933 3 D.L.R. 
260) a doctor engaged to perform a hernia operation was held to 
have been justified in removing the plaintiffts testicle, where 
in the course of the operation he found conditions which indicated 
that removal was required both to repair the hernia and to protect 
the patientls life. 
Thus the rule accepted in Canadian and American cases 
with regard to emergencies is as follows: -
Where the danger disclosed is of such a nature that 
immediate steps are necessary in order to preserve the 
life, limb or health of the patient, a doctor is 
justified in taking such steps even though no consent 
has been obtained. On the other hand7 if the condition 
disclosed is not of such a nature as to involve any 
immediate danger to life, limb or health of the patient 
then the doctor may become liable in assault for 
performing an operation to which the patient has not 
consented. 
What is the juridical basis upon which it is possible 
to excuse a surgeon from liability who operates upon 
his patient without his consent. 
In the American cases a number of different suggestions 
have been put forward. Some of the cases tend to speak in terms 
of implied consent in these situations. But this is an obvious 
fiction. Implied consent in its real sense is consent implied 
from conduct for e.g. holding onets arm out to be vaccinated 
implies consent to the vaccination. 
5 
The phrase tgood surgeryt has been used in some of 
the cases but its use is not helpful, it is general, vague 
and ambiguous. 
A case of importance is Bennan v Parsonnet (1912 83 
N.J. 1.20) where a new principle of law was propounded, namely 
that of holding the operating surgeon to be the representative 
of the patient to give consento 
by Chisholm Jin Marshall v Curry 
However this has been criticized 
"There is unreality about that view. The idea of 
appointing such a representative, the necessity for 
it, the existence of a condition calling for a 
different operation are entirely absent from the 
minds of both patient and surgeon. The will of the 
patient is not exercised on the point. 
reality no such appointment." 
There is in 
I think the most satisfactory treatment of the point 
comes from Chisholm C.J. in the above-mentioned Canadian case 
of Marshall v Curry (1933 3 D.L.R. 260). 
"In these emergen~ cases it is not useful to strain 
the law by establishing consent by fictions-by basing 
consent on things that do not exist. Is it not better 
to decide boldly that apart from any consent the 
conditions discovered make it imperative on the part 
of the surgeon to operateJ and if he performs the duty 
skilfully and with due prudence, that no action shall 
lie against him for doing so~" 
What is the position with regard to a patient who expressly prohibits treatment even in emergencies creating an imminent threat to a patientts life or health? 
In the American case of Rolaier v Strain (137 Pac. 96 
(1913)) the patient presented herself for treatment of an 
in£1ammatory condition of her toe. She was advised to have 
it incised and drained after removing any foreign material 
that might be present. She agreed to the treatment but told 
the doctor not to remove any bones. During surgery he found 
that access to the area of infection was blocked by a sesamoid 
bone and only way to drain the area was to remove the bone. 
Though the doctor testified that serious consequences could 
have followed if it was inadequately drained, the Court held 
him liable, stating that it was relying on Mohr v. Williams. 
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However, it can be pointed out that as the physician had 
permission to treat the toe, being restricted in how he would 
treat it, the case differs from Mohr where the doctor went 
outside the scope of his original consent to treat an ear 
which he had no permission to treat. 
In the Canadian case of Mulloy v Hop Sang (1935 1 
WWR 714) the doctor was held liable for the unauthorised 
amputation of a hand which the patient had expressly forbidden 
to amputate despite the fact that it was badly damaged, that 
three surgeons agreed, that the amputation was necessary in 
order to prevent blood poisoning. It is clear from these 
cases that if the patient expressly forbade the surgeon to exceed 
the consent, he will be liable in battery if he disobeys 
instructim;. However, the English Courts have taken a different 
@roach. In the only English case on the subject Beatty v. 
Cullingworth (1896 B.M.J. 1546) patient instructed the surgeon 
notJremove both ovaries though she consented to a single operation, 
but the surgeon found both ovaries diseased and removed them. 
It was held that he was legally justified. 
But the proper rule should be that a doctor should be 
' justified in disregarding his patients express instruction where 
) a condition exists or arises which constitutes a threat to patients 
life. On the other hand1 if the condition that exists is not of 
such a nature as to involve a threat to patient's life, limb 
or health, then the doctor should not proceed to disregard such 
express prohibition. 
What is the position with regard to an adult patient 
who refuses to consent to life-saving medical treatment 
such as a blood transfusion? 
This is an area where the individualts right to determine 
what shall be done with his own body and the lawts traditional 
view of sanctity of life come into direct conflict. Should a 
Court order that treatment be given or should it respect the 
individualts commands and let him die? The few American Courts 
which have faced this problem are divided as to the proper course. 
In the case of Application of President of Georgetown 
College Inc. (1331 F 2d 1000; 377 U.S. 978 (1964)) a mother 
of a 7 month old baby had massive internal bleeding due to a 
ruptured ulcer and this necessitated an immediate blood 
transfusion. Hospital officials sought a Court Order 
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authorizing the transfusion. The judge ordered a transfusion on 
the ground that it was necessary to preserve the status quo. 
He thought that the State had an interest in preserving the life 
of a mother of a seven month old child, sufficient to justify 
authorising transfusions to save her life. 
Another case of interest is . Raleigh Pitkin-Paul Morgan 
Memorial Hospital v Anderson (42 N J 421; 201 A2d 537 (1964)). 
In this case the patient, a Jehovahts Witness, in her 32nd week 
of pregnancy suffered from a condition that would necessitate 
blood transfusions during the delivery of her child. When the 
physicians came to know about the patientls objection to the 
proposed treatment 
appeal1pourt held 
made necessary by 
they sought judicial authorisation. On 
11 the blood transfusions (including transfusions 
delivery) may be administered if necessary 
to save her life or the life of her child, as the physician in 
charge at the time may determine. 11 at 423. By thisJif the Court 
meant only that the motherls life should be saved if such was 
required to save the life of her child, then the casg7Re regarded 
only as a logical extension of the power of State as parens 
patriae to authorise medical treatment on children over their 
J 
parents objection.S., On the other hantl;if the Court meant to 
authorize transfusions on the mother even though it was not 
necessary to save the child (i.e. after the child was delivered) 
then this case• is clearer than the Georgetown case in holding 
that an adult patient cannot reject life-saving treatment. 
However writers have expressed the view that there is some 
ambiguity as to the true meaning of the decision. 
~ Another American case Erickson v Dilgard (252 NYS 2d 
705 (S.C. 1962)) where an adult Jehovahts Witness patient (without 
complicating factors such as unborn or minor children) refused 
an emergency blood transfusion, Court held that he had the right 
to refuse a blood transfusion and in refusing an emergency 
transfusion, was simply making a medical decision which the 
Courts could not refuse. 
However, it appears that answers given by Courts vary 
according to the facts and circumstances of each case but on 
the whole support the view that an adult has the right to use 
what therapy he will accept even if refusal means death, unless 
there are unusual circumstances such as an unborn child or 
dependant children. 
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Howeve~ a recent American case (Re Estate of B:ooks 32 
Ill 2d 361) held that where the refusi. of treatment was due to 
religious conviction, such action constituted an infringement of 
religious liberty. Howe"\0.", the issue is unsettled in the United 
States. Therefore the question whether the rendition of emergency 
life-saving medical treatment on the person of the objecting adult 
is proper, remains to be answered. 
Euthanasia and Life Saving Treatment. 
Under the present law euthanasia would constitute 
homicide, the patientts consent being no defence. The primary 
reason why the law condemns tmercy killingt is the interest the 
society has in the life of the individualo 1The public interest 
in the life of the individual is attested by the fact that 
euthanasia continues to be illegal homicide and by the remnants 
of the common laws severe penalties for suicide, e.g. the rules 
against abetting and in some places against attempting suicide. (l) 
If this is the reason why the individual has no right to consent 
to his own death in the euthanasia situation then it could be 
said that such a patient would have no right to prohibit life-
saving medical treatment. 
Suicide and Life Saving Treatment. 
At this point it could be pointed out that it is 
obviously proper for a physician to save his patientts life by 
unauthorised treatment, if the physician in doing so is in the 
same position as the individual who has prevented suicide. The 
policy of the society must be against allowing its members to 
commit suicide even though it is no longer a crime. Therefore 
to hold a physician who gives unauthorised treatment to save 
the life of the patient liable and the rescuer from suicide 
privileged would be absurd. Take for example two hospital 
patients both in need of blood transfusions, one rejects them 
because of a desire to die, the other because of religious 
reasons. Is it justified if the law allows a patient wishing 
to live but preferring death to breach of religious faith to die, 
while forcing the one wishing to die, to live? If the non-
religious suicide should be prevented, then so should the 
religious suicide. 
In these analagous areas of euthanasia and suicide 
the law has uniformly denied significance to the individualts 
consent to his own death and consequently it should be expected 
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that the same result will follow in the case of refusal of 
lifesaving treatment. In the American case of Meyer v Supreme 
Lodge ~.P. ((1904) 70 NE 111) the New York Court of Appeal held 
that a physician who gave medical treatment to an attempted 
suicide contrary to his express wishes was not liable in trespass. 
The Council of the Medical Defence Union (in England) 
in its booklet called 1 Consent to Operative Treatmentt containing 
suggested formulae for various contingencies>sets out a special 
form to be signed by a patient who refuses to have a blood 
transfusion even though this may be necessary 11 to render the 
operation successful or to prevent injury to my health or even 
to preserve,tny life. 11 
However, the procedure recommended might not give the 
surgeon full protection. A surgeon who undertakes to perform 
an operation on a Jehovahls Witness knowing that the necessity 
for a blood transfusion may arise and that he will then be 
precluded from giving it, might be sued by the patient or his 
relatives for negligence. Also it is recommended by the Union 
that 11 if the patientts signature cannot be obtained a note to 
that effect should be entered in the medical records" and the 
"patient should be informed by the surgeon that in the circumstances 
he cannot accept complete responsibility. 11 However, it has been 
pointed out by Diana M. Kloss (Z)lif the patient refuses to sign 
the prescribed form it cannot be said that he has consented to 
any operative procedure whether involving a blood transfusion or 
not. No surgeon can absolve himself from legal liability by 
mere unilateral declaration. However if the patient subsequently 
to refusing to sign the form, voluntarily and freely submits to 
the operation, it is probable that the Court would hold that he 
has in fact assumed the risk of necessity for a blood transfusion 
arising even though there is no written evidence to that effect.t 
Since the issue is not judicially resolved in practice 
a surgeon will always hesitate before performing an operation on 
Jehovahls Witness, which would involve a transfusion without any 
good evidence that the patient assumed the risk and freely 
absolves him from liability. 
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(III) SURGICAL OPERATIONS AND THE QUESTION OF BODILY HARM: 
Surgical operations by their very nature, although 
thought to be beneficial to the patient, involve injury or physical 
harm to the patient at least in the short run. But surgical 
operations for medical purposes are obviously lawful, although 
they involve infliction of wounds on the patient - (Stephen. Digest 
Art. 310). Thus when a surgeon performs a doubtful operation 
(i.e. where the legality of the operation is in doubt), his criminal 
liability may become an issue. In New Zealand, determination of 
criminal responsibility of a surgeon who performs such an operation 
rests exclusively on statute, i.e. on the provisions of the Crimes 
Act 1961. It would seem that the surgical steps involved in 
doubtful operations such as sterilisation, sex conversion, grafting 
of organs {i.e. live donor transplants) etc., may come within the 
definition of the expression lto injurel in S.2 (1) of the Crimes 
Act as meaning ~o cause actual bodily harmt. Although the terms 
tactual bodily harml have not been specifically defined in the 
Crimes Act, they have been defined in a number of English cases. 
This term is used in the Crimes Act as distinct from grievous 
bodily harm. See S. 188 (1) and 188 (2). 
All that is necessary to constitute actual bodily harm 
(according to Archibold 32nd ed. P. 959) is that there should be 
hurt or injury calculated to interfere with health or comfort of 
the prosecutor. It need not be an injury of a permanent character 
nor need it amount to what would be considered to be a grievous 
bodily harm. 11 It may mean internal as well as external injuries 
and need not be permanent nor dangerous nor amount to maiming, 
disfigurement or disablement. 11 {Russel P. 627) In R v Donovan 
(1934 2 KB 498 at 509) it has been defined as follows: "Bodily 
harm includes any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with the 
health or comfort of the prosecutor. Such hurt or injury need 
not be permanent, but must no doubt be more than merely transient 
and trifling. 11 In Regina v Miller (1954 2 Q.B. 282 at 292) 
Lynskey J. held that this included a hysterical and nervous 
condition resulting from an assault, taking the view that an injury 
to mants mind is actual bodily harm. "Bodily harm" according to 
the House of Lords in Director of Public Prosecutor v Smith 
(1961 A.C. 290 at P.332) "needs no explanation. tGrievousl means 
no more and no less than really serious." The House of Lords 
said that there was no warrant for giving the words a meaning 
other than that which they convey in their ordinary and natural 
meaning. 
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The relevance of this aspect of criminal law is that it 
provides a basis for saying that many surgical operations are 
prima facie unlawful. Without further justification not only 
would operations be criminal acts, but they would also be unlawful 
in the civil law and surgeons might be liable to pay compensation 
for the consequences of their acts, even though they had exercised 
all reasonable care. Therefore it is relevant to consider the 
criteria that convert unlawful acts into lawful surgical operations. 
Consent is one of these. Other criteria are contained in S.61 
of the Crimes Act. 
(IV.) CONSENT AS A DEFENCE: 
When a doctor performs an operation that is said to be 
a prima facie assault, the question arises how far is 
the consent of the person assaulted a defence to a charge? 
Consent of the patient or victim is no defence to a 
charge of crime. Assault is a crime as well as a civil wrong. 
If the victim avails himself of his civil rights only and sues for 
compensation consent is a good defence. But if he or police 
prosecute for a crime consent is no answer; 
consent is irrelevant. ( 3 ) 
the :irrlividuals 
Examination of the cas~ dealing with consent as a 
defence, will reveal that there are limits to the degree of 
physical harm to which a person can effectively consent; but 
where the line is to be drawn is by no means clear. In some 
of the English cases, the defence of consent has been treated 
as follows: 
1) Consent is ineffective to exclude liability in respect 
of assaults which are of a dangerous or serious nature; i.eo 
when there is a likelihood of bodily harm. 
R.V. Coney (1882 Q.B.D. 534 at 547) It is submitted that this 
criterion has very little value as a general principle; clearly 
at least one type of taggressiont upon the body can be lawful, even 
when it is extremely dangerous. viz. a medical operation. 
2) Consent is no defence, when the conduct consented to 
has the tendency to create a ?breach of the peacet. 
R.V. Coney (1882 Q.B.D. 534 at 539) Cave J. said: 
Thus in 
11 The true view is, I think, that a blow struck in 
anger or which is likely or intended to cause bodily harm is 
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not an assault and that assault being a breach of the peace and 
unlawful, the consent of the person struck is immaterial. If 
this view is correct a blow struck in a price fight is clearly an 
assault, but playing with single sticks or wrestling do not 
involve an assault, nor does boxing with gloves in the ordinary 
way and not with the ferocity and severe punishment to the 
boxers deposed to in R.V. Orton." 
If blows struck in boxing are lawful, then it is clear 
that it is permissible to submit to the infliction of some degree 
of bodily harm. 
3) Consent is a defence when the conduct in itself is not 
unlawful. R. v Donovan (1934 2 K.B. 498) In this case a man 
was charged with beating a girl for purpose of sexual gratification. 
The Court of Appeal took occasion to go into the general question 
whether the consent of the prosecutrix would constitute a defence 
in law. The view taken by the Court was that 11 if the blows 
struck were likely or intended to do bodily harm to the prose-
cutrix" then they would be unlawful acts and her consent would 
be no defence. "For this purpose we think that bodily harm has 
its ordinary meaning and includes any hurt or injury calculated 
to interfere with the health or comfort of the victim. Such hurt 
or injury needmt be permanent but must no doubt be more than 
merely transient or trifling." (AtP. 509). However the 
Court said "there are well established exceptions to the general 
rule that an act likely or intended to cause bodily harm is an 
unlawful act, 11 e.g. sport or play, manly diversions and reasonable 
chastisement of a child. 
Lord Devlin( 4 )thinks if the rule is right the question 
in future will be whether a particular case does or does not 
constitute ta well recognised exception!. He also pointed out 
that most surgical operations would come within this exception 
except those operations performed in circumstances which were 
thought to be injurious to the public; for example, sterilisation 
operations without good medical reason and abortion. Thus it is 
clear tht, consent is a defence to criminal liability in the case 
of certain assaults including many forms of surgical operations. 
However when the particular assault is in itself unlawful or 
where it is prohibited by law (such as abortion) the consent of 
the person assaulted affords no defence. 
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The seriousness of the bodily harm likely to be 
incurred is then a very important factor in determining whether 
consent is legally operative. But it is clearly rot the only 
factor involved. Account must also be taken of the purpose 
of the operation, for example if the purpose of the operation 
is against public policy, then the operation becomes unlawful. 
Here it becomes relevant to consider separately 
surgical procedures such as abortion, sterilisation, sex 
conversion, grafting of organs etc. and the possible effect in 
such cases of the doctrine laid down in R v Donovan as to the 
validity of consent in respect of an assault which interferes 
with health or comfort. Also it is important to consider the 
special defence available under S.61 of the Crimes Act 1961 in 
relation to each of these categories of operations. 
(V.) ABORTION: 
The most obvious example of an unlawful operation is 
that of abortion and in New Zealand it depends upon statute. Apart 
from cases where abortion is possible under Crimes Act of 1961, 
abortions are statutory criminal offences whether performed by 
doctors or unqualified persons. S.182 (2) is the ground on which 
therapeutic abortion can be performed and is considered to be the 
legislative enactment of the principle enunciated in R v Bourne 
where McNaughten J. held that intention to preserve the life of 
the mother rendered an abortion lawful and extended the concept of 
life to include both physical and mental health. Under S. 183 
unlawful use of an instrument or the administration of a drug 
on a woman with intent to procure miscarriage is an offence. 
A defence based on the lawfulness of that use would still have 
to be concerned with the physical and mental health of the mother. 
Therefore all abortions performed by a doctor other than for the 
purpose of preserving the life of the mother (extended to include• 
both physical and mental health) are unlawful. Thus it is clear 
that a doctor in New Zealand cannot escape the penalty for perform-
ing an illegal abortion by arguing that the woman consented, i.eo 
consent is no defence to a charge of illegal abortion. 
It must be added that the fundamental grounds of 
justification of abortion in the New Zealand law are good faith 
and preservation of the life of the mother (under S.182 (2)) and 
not consent so that the ~pi.~ion of a foetus under those 
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circumstances can be lawful and even where the woman did not 
consent. Should lawfulness of abortion ever be extended to 
other grounds such as economic or eugenic grounds, the factor 
of consent will of course, be introduced. 
Sanctity of Life P.214). 
(see G. Williams 
What is the effect of consent by a woman to an illegal abortion on the civil liability of a doctor? 
In other words can a woman who has willingly undergone 
an illegal abortion, later sue the doctor who performed it in 
battery and recover damages? 
With regard to this question legal opinion is divided. 
The view that no action lies is supported by Salmond. ( 5 ) The 
contrary view is put forward by Windfield. ( 6 ) In America, there 
is a sharp conflict of authority on the question whether consent 
of a woman to an illegal abortion precludes recovery of damages 
for the consequences of that act. Thus in Hunter v White 
(1923 31 A.L.R. 980) it was held that a woman, who voluntarily 
submitted to an abortion and sustained injury thereby caused by 
the negligent treatment afforded her by the defendant physician 
who performed the operation, could not maintain an action for 
recovery of damages since the transaction was not merely immoral 
but was illegal as being in contravention of a statute. So too, 
in Martin v Morris (21 A.L.Ro 2d 370) an action by a woman to 
recover for injuries sustained by reason of an abortion was 
dismissed, the Court reasoning that it would not lend its support 
to an action based upon an immoral and illegal transaction. In 
Miller v. Bennet «1949), 21 A.L.R. 2d 364) the Court denied 
recovery in an action brought by personal representative of a 
married woman who submitted to an abortion, on the ground that 
the decedent was guilty of a moral crime and had been the 
participant in the violation of an anti-abortion statuteo Thus 
in these cases where recovery is denied, the reasoning of the 
Courts is based upon the premise that the female was a willing 
participant in the crime of abortion and having taken part in 
an illegal transaction, is barred fromrmintaining an action 
arising out of such transaction. 
However, in Miller v Heddesheimer ((1924) 33 ~.L.R. 53) 
the administratr of a woman who died as a result of an abortion 
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was permitted to recover from the physician who performed the 
operation, the Court holding that the consent of the person 
injured will not preclude recovery, when such act involves a 
violation of the public peace, or the life of the person 
involved. In Martin v Hardesty ((1928) 21 A.L.R. 372) it was 
held the the consent of the woman to the operation couldmt be 
interposed as a defence to an action brought to recover damages 
for the death of a woman as a nsult of an illegal abortion,and in 
support of its position stated the rule that consent of a person 
to an act prohibited by law is not a defence to an action brought 
for injur•ies to the consenting party resulting from such act. 
Again in Hancock v Hullet (1918, 21 A.L.R. 2d 372) the father of a 
minor upon whom an abortion was performed was held not to be 
precluded by reason of daughterls consent to the operation, since 
as a minor she could not legally consent to a transaction which 
constituted a criminal offence. Thus in these cases in which it 
has been held that recovery could be had, by the woman or her 
representative notwithstanding her consent, the grounds for 
recovery have been predicated upon various lines of reasoning. 
However, I think the better view is that there should be no 
remedy in damages, to those who claim for the results of a crime 
in which they willingly participated. 
When an abortion is negligently performed there have 
been instances where the Courts have awarded damages in negligence 
despite the consent of the woman. In Andrews v Coutler (1931, 
21 A.L.R. 2d 373) a woman who was abandoned after an illegal 
abortion by a doctor, even though she was seriously ill as a 
result of the abortion was held able to recover damages, 
notwithstanding her consent. The Court further held that 
recovery would be permitted where complaint was not based 
merely upon an allegation that the physician was negligent but 
alleged also that after the deceased suffered complications 
resulting from the operation he failed to give her any treatment 
whatsoever
1
and completely abandoned her without informing her 
family of her condition. 
Third parties who have suffered damages as a result of 
an unlawful abortion will not be prevented from claiming damages 
unless they claim directly through a willing participant in the 
crime. In Touriel v Benveniste (reported in 1961 110 U. of 
Penn L.R. 908) a husband brought an action against the surgeon 
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who had performed an illegal abortion on the plaintiffts wife; 
thus depriving him of his unborn child. The Court held that 
he had a prima facie cause of action, which wasmt barred by 
his wifets consent to an illegal operation, since he was claiming 
in his own right for the invasion of his marital interest in the 
unborn child. With regard to the question, whether the husband 
could sue for loss of his wifels services as a result of an 
illegal operation to which she has consented, it is submitted 
that as long as he in no way participated in the criminal 
operation, he should be able to recover despite his wife 1s 
consent. 
(VIo) STERILISATION: 
Sterilisation is a medical operation performable either 
on a male or female whereby the ability to procreate is eliminated. 
But it does not preclude further sexual intercourse from a 
physiological standpoint and does not as is sometimes erroneously 
thought, de-sex the individual.( 7) In the man the most common 
surgical method of sterilisation is called vasectomy, accomplished 
by cutting and tying the vas deferense above the testis. In the 
woman the operation is normally performed by cutting and tying 
the fallopian tubes between ovaries and the womb or by removing 
the womb. (hysterectomy.) 
Before we go on to the question whether a person can 
validly consent to such an operation and if so what effect it has 
on a physicianis liability, it is necessary to consider whether 
such an operation is lawful. The law with regard to sterilisation 
operations is uncertain. Countries have approached this problem 
in different ways and consideration of some of the approaches 
would be instructive. 
American Approach: 
Several American States specifically provide that 
voluntary sterilisation undertaken for therapeutic reasons 
is legal. In three American States voluntary sterilisation 
is expressly prohibited by statute except for therapeutic 
or eugenic purposes. In a number of States there is no legislation 
whatsoever concerning the legality of voluntary sterilisation. 
Following are a few American cases which have dealt with the 
question of legality of such operations. In the case of 
Christiansen v Thornby (192 Minn 123:255) a husband brought an 
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action for the recovery of damages for anxiety and expenses he 
experienced in connection with the wifels pregnancy and successful 
delivery, subsequent to his having undergone a vasectomy to 
ensure sterility and avoid the danger of the wifets bearing a 
second child. On the question of legality, the Court held that 
under the facts of the case, a healthy child having been born 
to the couple without complications, the voluntary sterilisation 
was justified on therapeutic grounds due to wifets unlikely 
prospects for a normal delivery. The Court held under such 
circumstances neither the contract for the operation nor the 
operation itself was against public policy and illegal on that 
basis. 
In the case of Shaheen v Knight (11 Pa. Dist 2 Co. R 
2d 41 1957) the husband sued the physician for failure to sterilise 
him permanently basing his right to recover on breach of contract. 
However, this case is distinguishable from Christiansen in that 
no medical necessity existed for the operation but only the 
plaintiffts desire for permanent sterility to avoid birth of 
future children. The Court while stating that a contract to 
accomplish contraceptive sterilisation was not void as against 
public policy held that public policy forbade the recovery of 
damages for birth of a healthy child as a result of that contract 
being breached. 
In another American case Custodio v Bauer (251 Cal App. 
2d 303 1967) husband and wife brought an action against the 
physician for the negligent performance of a sterilisation 
operation and for breach of contract to sterile. With regard 
to the question of legality Court stated 11 it is generally 
recognised that a sterilisation operation for therapeutic purposes 
to protect the physical or mental health of the patient or in the 
case of vasectomy, the wife of the patient, is not against public 
policy •o•••• It has been suggested that such an operation for 
purpose of family limitation motivated solely by personal or 
socio-economic considerations is likewise not anti-ethical to 
public policy••••••• Where not prohibited by statute the matter 
would appear to be one of individual conscience •••••••• 11 The 
result of these cases appear to be that in America the prevailing 
view is that a voluntary sterilisation, if carried out with necess-
ary care and consent, is not contrary to public policy. 
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British Approach: 
The problem of legality of the operation has not been 
raised in England except in the obiter dictum of Denning L.J. 
in Bravery v Bravery (1954 3 AER 59 C.A.) In this case wife 
brought a divorce action on grounds of cruelty alleging that her 
husband had voluntarily undergone an operation for sterilisation, 
after birth of their 1st child,without her consent and thus caused 
her health to suffer. Two of the judges ruled that this was not 
cruelty while the third Justice Denning ruled that it was cruelty 
and that sterilisation for a motive of this kind was unlawful. 
He mde the following observations in the dissenting .judgement) 
with regard to the question whether such an operation is contrary 
to public policy and common decency so as to make consent no 
defence to its criminal characterisation. At P.P. 67-8 "•••••• ~ 
A Sterilisation Operation. When it is done with a mants consent i\ 
for a just cause it is quite lawful, as for instance, when it is 
done to prevent the transmission of a hereditary disease; but 
when it is done without just cause or excuse it is unlawful even 
though the man consents to it. Take a case where a sterilisation 
operation is done so as to enable a man to have the pleasure 
of sexual intercourse without shouldering the nsponsibilities 
attaching to it. 11 
the public interest. 
The operation is then plainly injurious to 
Denning L.J. went on to cite the case of R v Donovan 
to support his µoposition that a vasectomy operation performed 
on a married man (with his consent) was a criminal assault which 
public policy would not allow consent to excuse. The other 2 
judges disagreed with him. However in this case majority opinion 
would support the view that a vasectomy operation performed on 
a man with his consent is mt illegal. 
The degree of harm or injury involved is not the 
decisive criterion but is rather only a major element in determ:ining 
whether or not the operation is not contrary to public policy. 
Surgical operations by their very nature, although thought to be 
beneficial to the patient involve injury or physical harm at least 
in the short run. As a result, the criminality of a surgical 
procedure should not simply be judged by the degree of injury 
caused but rather by its effect on the individual concerned, as a 
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responsible member of the society and on the members of the 
public. It is a social policy decision. Consent is a relevant 
factor in the making of the decision, but the question of 
necessity in an immediate and broader context, is perhaps the 
consideration that should be determinative. (S) 
In a medical-surgical context, consent and medical 
necessity ordinarily operate as defencesto the initial character-
isation of the operation as an assault, presuming the object of 
or the motivation for the sterilisation is lawfulo ( 9 ) 
Question arises what then is a lawful purpose? 
In 1960 Medical Defence Union in England sought the 
opinion of legal counsel upon whether the sterilization of a 
male or female was legal and if so in what circumstances. The 
opinion expressed was published in the Annual Report of the 
Medical Defence Union(lO)l961 as follows: tSterilization is not 
unlawful whether it is performed on therapeutic or eugenic grounds 
or for other reasons, provided there is full and valid consent 
to the operation by the patient concerned.? 
Lord Devlin in a 1960 address(ll)to doctors seems to 
have accepted the opinion of the English Medical Defence Union, 
that non-therapeutic voluntary sterilisation is lawful, if proper 
consent is given, and the operation is performed for a purpose 
tnot otherwise criminalt. He also stated 11 I would suggest as a 
broad principle that an assault should not be treated as criminal 
if it is done 
(a) for the purpose of averting danger to life or grave 
and immediate injury to health or 
(b) with the consent of the other party and for a 
purpose which is not otherwise criminal. 
Abortion for example is a mere crime in itself and so consent to 
it would remain irrelevant; 
under the first heading. 
the act would have to be justified 
If it is thought that sterilisation 
although done by consent, should be prohibited except for grave 
medical reasons, then it should be made a crime in itself and 
should mt try to catch it as a form of assault. 11 
In 1966(lZ)the Secretary of the English Medical Defence 
Union re-affirmed the opinion expressed by counsel in 1961, i.e. 
that sterilisation carried out merely on grounds of personal 
- 20 -
convenience, (In other words as a convenient method of birth 
control) is a legitimate and legal undertaking, but reminded 
the profession that this opinion was not based on any stable 
judicial authority as it had never been tested in Courts. 
Even though the law of England regarding sterilisation 
remains to be stated authoritatively and Bravery v Bravery 
clarified, it is unlikely that a surgeon would be held liable 
for a criminal assault for performing a non-therapeutic 
sterilisation operation if it is performed with the consent of 
both husband and wife. 
It (13) is unlikely that Courts would today create new 
crimes of th:B kind so that unless and until they are made illegal 
by statute, operations for sterilisation and castration will be 
treated in the same waycE other surgical operations. 
It is (l4 )submitted that this broad public policy 
question should not be answered by Courts in any given case but 
that the question should be answered by statute. In the meantime 
consent should nullify any criminal liability for the performance 
of a voluntary sterilisation. In (lS)the absence of some 
compelling legal justification as evidenced in a statute on this 
subject, it is the desirable course to maximise personal freedom. 
Assuming that sterilisation of a spouse can be justified on certain 
grounds, an important question still remains. 
Should both spouses consent or is consent of the party 
submitting to the operation sufficient? 
If a surgeon operates to sterilise a married person 
on non-therapeutic grounds without the consent of the other 
spouse, he may well lay himself open to a civil action for damages. 
The 1966 Annual REport of the English Medical Defence Union 
indicatedJsuch a course might constitute a loss of consortium 
to the unconsenting spouse. 
Apart from loss of consortium action, unilateral 
submission to a sterilisation operation in Britain would afford 
the unconsenting spouse grounds for divorce by reason of crueltyf16 ) 
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The better view seems to be that , as a general rule/ 
consent of both parties should be obtained. However,there may 
be special circumstances justifying sterilisation of a consenting 
spouse even in the absence of the other spousets consent. The 
example given by Williams iThe Sanctity of Lifet P.101, the 
mother of a large family who will suffer a nervous breakdown 
should she become pregnant again will fall within thiscategory 
of case. 
If it is accepted that the consent of both spouses 
is necessary, it follows that the sterilised spouse (having 
consented) will have no claim for damages, while the other 
spouse, having not consented, will in fact have such a right 
of action. If a sterilisation operation is performed upon a 
spouse who has been misled into believing that an operation is 
an entirely different one and the intact spouse has consented to 
the sterilisation, the former will be able to sue, whereas the 
latter will lose his or her right of action. (l7 ) 
POSITION IN NEW ZEALAND 
Civil liability of a surgeon who performs a sterilisation 
operationo 
Provided the patient and the spouse of full age, who 
have full knowledge of all the consequences of the operation 
consent to the surgery there is no reason why a sterilisation 
operation performed without negligence should be an offence under 
the civil law. The Ct§ims of consent which surgeons in New 
Zealand require their female patients and their spouses to sign 
before a sterilisation operation are as follows 
II hereby agree to under/fhe operation of sterilisation. 
I fully understand that this will produce permanent inability to 
become pregnant. 
Signed •••.....•...• 
Witness •••••••••••• 
Date • • ~ • • • • • • • • • • I 
II here by agree for my wife to undergo the operation 
of sterilisation. I fully understand that this will produce 
permanent inability to become pregnant. 
Signed 
Witness 
Date 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
............. , 
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PRACTICE IN NEW ZEALAND 
D. Urquhart(l 9)Urologist, Wellington Hospital states 
fthe usual person referred for vasectomy is a married male in 
his thirties or forties, with 2-3 children; whose wife has 
found the lpillf unsuitable for various reasons ••••••• the 
couple are usually adamant that they have enough children and 
that further children would be disastrous for socio-economic 
reasons. They have usually discussed the problem fully between 
themselves and with their practitioner •••••• It is important 
to interview both husband and wife together so that one can 
assess the couple and see that they fully understand the nature 
of their request •••••• It is essential to emphasize that it takes 
2 - 3 months before the male is rendered sterile. I have both 
husband and wife sign a statement which I witness confirming that 
they fully understand the nature and effect of the operation and 
that they give me their consent to have it carried out on the 
husband. Consent on the part of the panient is a necessary 
legal safeguard in any operation to protect the surgeon, the 
wifeis signature in this is to protect the husband from divorce 
suit on grounds of constructive desertion.I He further states 
lit is my practice, then to carry out a vasectomy for any couple, 
who for socio-economic rmsons wish to limit their family or who 
for contraceptive convenience wish to have it done. They must 
be a stable happily married couple, generally with a family who 
are prepared to discuss their problem fully with me and give me 
their written permission to operate and assurance that they 
understand the nature of their request.I 
t 
I would not limit the operation to married males but 
I would be very cautious in operating on single males unless 
the reasons were ethically acceptable. One must probe carefully 
for a history of neurosis or psychosis as subsequent ailment may 
easily be attributed to the vasectomy itself. If there is doubt 
as to the suitability or otherwise of the case a second medical 
opinion should always be soughtol 
Consent and the Criminal Liability of a Surgeon who 
performs such an operation in New Zealand. 
There is no statutory reference in New Zea1nd regarding 
sterilisation compulsory or voluntary. Criminal liability of a 
surgeon who performs such an operation depends upon the provisions 
of the Crimes Act of 1961. Here the question arises whether a 
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sterilisation operation can be said to constitute a tgrievous 
bodily harml or a tmaimf within the terms of S.188 (1) or S.188 (2) 
of the Crimes Act of 1961. S.188 (1) and (2) have extended 
criminal liability for assault to include maiming, disfiguring 
or causing grievous bodily harm to any person either with intent 
to cause grievous bodily harm or with intent to injure. If the 
word lmaiml is given its normal meaning tto mutilate, cripple,to 
deprive of the use ofl it is not unreasonable to consider 
sterilisation operation as a lmaiml. 
The next question is whether a surgeon; who performs 
such an operation in New Zealand can bring himself within the defenct 
available under S.61 of the Crimes Act. 
Where a sterilisation operation is performed on any male 
or female where contraception has proved impracticable or 
unreliable , resulting in the birth of unwanted children and 
if the physician is able to show that the patients physical or 
mental health is liable to suffer or deteriorate from the birth 
of future off-spring such operation should be considered as legal 
within S.61 of the Crimes Act as it is carried out for the benefit 
of the patient, provided other conditions required thereunder 
are satisfied. 
If the surgical steps involved in a sterilisation 
operation can be said to consi.tute a lmaiml within the terms 
of the Act, then the consent of the person assaulted is not 
a defence at least to criminal liability in the absence of 
other conditions required under S.61. 
(VII.) CONSENT AND S.61 OF THE CRIMES ACT: 
A more difficult question is the relevance or the 
effect of consent on the criminal liability of a surgeon who 
seeks protection under S.61 of the Crimes Act. In New Zealand 
the relevance or the effect of consent on a surgeonts criminal 
liability who performs such an operation would depend on the 
interpretation that would be given to S.61 of the Crimes Act. 
There is no case law on the defence of S.61. However 
Adams( 2o)in !Criminal Law and Practice in New Zealandl (page 129 
1964 ed.) states - ••••• tthe fact that section protects only 
from criminal responsibility suggests that it was 
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not framed with a view to operations performed with consent or 
at any rate not solely with reference thereto •••••••• The 
section indeed seems to be superogatory in regard to such 
operations. This does not exclude its application to them and 
it may be taken for granted that the section will apply to 
~ operations performed with consent. But~in terms)section is 
A 
equally applicable to operations performed without consent or in 
spite of the refusal of consent and on its face might be read as 
justifying, from the criminal point of view, the forcible 
subjection of an unwilling patient to an operation which the 
surgeon rightly or wrongly deem to be for his benefit. This 
result can be avoided only by construing lreasonablet not as 
referring merely to therapeutic reasonableness or reasonableness fror 
the point of view of the patientts physical state and circumstances, 
but as including the matter of his will:irgness or unwillingness 
to undergo the operation. 
> 
-taken even though the patientts refusal were itself unreasonable. 
The wider view would probably be 
If the word treasonablel in the section is interpreted 
to mean not only therapeutic reasonableness or reasonableness 
from the point of view of the patient ls physical state and circum -
stances but also to include a patientls willingness or unwillingness 
to undergo an operation, then it could be said that the consent 
of the patient would be a relevant factor in determining the 
question of reasonableness under S.61. 
(VIII.) SEX CHANGE OPERATIONS: 
There is evidence that in various parts of the world 
sex change operations have been performed and as a result of 
such surgery persons who were born with genitalia of a man or of 
a woman have been able to have those replaced by the genitalia 
of a woman or of a man respectively. However it must be noted 
that this physical conversion surgery is an irreversible yet 
incomplete therapy. 
One impediment for a homosexual seeking surgery is the 
fear of medical community that the operation is of dubious legality. 
Doctors are equally afraid of possible civil liability for battery. 
Professor Glanville William states(Zl)tEven the so-called change 
of sex operations have not been thought of as raising legal 
problems, although, it involves surgical interference with the 
genital organs. Since surgical operations have been characterized 
by the Common Law« p.f. assaults, one hesitates to accept 
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his conclusion with regard to sex-change operations which usually 
involve drastic methods of surgery. 
Effect of consent on the civil and criminal liability 
of a surgeon who performs such an operation: 
Consent and the Civil Liability: 
Professor G.P. Barton states (ZZ)tSo long as the patient 
is able to form a raEoned judgement on the question and consents 
to the operation, then he or she will have no action in law 
against the surgeon in respect of any cutting, engrafting or 
otherwise changing his or her genitalia.~ The only remedy against 
the surgeon will be in negligence where in the performance of 
the operation the surgeon has failed to diagnose, advise, 
operate or otherwise treat the patient with the degree of skill 
and care appropriate to the circumstances.t Therefore it is 
sufficiently clear if negligence were not alleged in a civil 
action for assault against the performing surgeon, consent may 
be taken as a complete defence; (i.e. volenti non-fit injuria) 
provided it is given with the full knowledge of the patient. 
In England the form of consent which surgeons require 
their male patients to sign before an operation for sex 
re-assignment is as follows 
II •••••• of•••••• do consent to undergo the removal 
of the male genital organs and fashioning of an artificial vagina 
as explained to me by •••••••• (surgeon). I understand that I will 
not alter my male sex and that it is being done to prevent 
deterioration in my mental health • 
•••••••••• (signature of patient)t(z 3) 
Consent and the Criminal Liability of a Surgeon: 
Consent is a defence to criminal liability in the case 
of certain assaults such as sexual intercourse, blows struck in 
pursuance of lawful sports, and most surgical operations or 
medical treatment. (R v Donovan 1934 2KB 498). But if the 
particular assault is in itself unlawful e.g. illegal operations 
like abortion or sterilisation without good medical reason, the 
consent of the person is not a defence at least to criminal 
liability. Therefore it becomes relevant to consider whether 
sex-conversion operations are unlawful. 
The most recent judicial pronouncement and apparently 
only case dealing directly with the legality of a consented to 
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conversion surgery comes from Argentina. ( 24 ) The case involved 
a charge of criminal assault brought against a doctor for 
performing corrective surgery on a male homosexual, whom the 
Court felt did not manifest feminine characteristics. On appeaL • 
the higher Court held the consent of the patient was no defence 
to the criminality of a surgical assault regardless of his 
impaired mental state. Such surgery could not be consented to 
lawfully. The higher Court stated on the defence of consent -
1The consent of the victim is not a defence. The act constitutes 
grievous bodily injury and in view of the consequences, a society 
cannot accept the consat of the victim whose interests are protected 
by this Court •••••• 1 
Criminal law of most countries today appears flexible 
enough to handle this problem without amendmentf 25 ) In Canada( 26 ) 
although there are no cases in point, it has been suggested that 
re-assignment surgery would be legal under S-45 of the Canadian 
Criminal Code, which is similar to S.61 of the Crimes Act of N.Z. 
provided it could be shown that the trans-sexual was in severe 
mental distress and would benefit from surgery. In N.Z. there 
is no specific legal authority dealing with conversion surgery 
as a therapeutic measure as is true in most countries but it has 
been suggested by Professor Barton ( 2'l)that sex-conversion operation 
may come within the definition of the expression tto injuref in 
S.2 (1) of the Crimes Act as meaning 1to cause actual bodily harml. 
S.188 (1) of the Crimes Act states that ibis an offence for anyoneJ 
with intent to cause grievous hodily har~ to wound, maim, disfigure 
or cause grievous bodily harm to any person,S.188 (2) makes it an 
offence for anyone to do the same act with intent to injure (as 
distinct from intent to cause grievous bodily harm.) Professor 
Barton thinks that if sex-conversion operation does not amount to 
grievous bodily harm it could be considered to amount to a 
1maimingt, when the term maiming is given its normal meaning 
Ito mutilate, cripple or deprive the use o~. 
Now the question to be considered here is the extent 
to which an individual1s consent will insulate the performing 
surgeon from criminal liability for the surgical invasion. 
Professor Barton( 28{n his article states if such question arises, 
it is likely to arise in the context of a criminal trial before 
a jury and therefore it may never receive a rationally articulated 
answer. 
27 
Before concluding that a surgeon who performs such an 
operation in N.Z. incurs criminal liability and that consent of 
the patient is immaterial, it is desirable to consider whether 
a performing surgeon could avail himself of the defence stated 
in S.61. A surgeon who seeks protection under this section 
would have to prove -
(a) that the operation is for the benefit of the 
patient and 
(b) that it is reasonable having regard to the 
patientts state at the time and all the 
circumstances of the case. 
Removal of genital organs would hardly be considered 
to be for the benefit of the patient unless it could be justified 
on grounds of mental well-being of the patient. Thus if a surgeon 
who performs such an operation is able to show that mental and 
psychological pressures on the trans-sexual is so great as to put 
himself on the verge of self mut.ilation or suicide he could 
bring himself within S. 61 (as the operation being carried out for 
the benefit of the patient) provided it is reasonable. If the 
word lreasonablet is given a wide interpretation so as to include 
) 
patients willingness or unwillingness to undergo the q:>eration, it 
is probable that consent of the patient would be taken into 
account by the Court in considering the reasonableness of such 
operation. 
The question may eventually be resolved by saying that 
consent to such operations will only negate their criminality 
when such operations can be said to be reasonable and when their 
purpose is considered to be for the benefit of the patient. 
(IX.) ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: 
The problem of consent by the donee is the conventional 
one of whether the donee has consented to the surgical procedure 
and the fact that procedure involves a transplant does not ea:ent-
ially change the nature of thf:Kiudicial approach to questions of 
consent, assault and battery or negligence. Any serious problems 
of consent involved in the transplantation are apt to concern the 
consent of the donor only. 
The problem of consent from the point of view of the 
physician is that when he fails to obtain the necessary consent 
h€¥11ay expose himself to a criminal or civil action. A defence 
sometimes available to the physician is that of emergency 
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(discussed above), where circumstances were such as to justify 
the procedure undertaken even in the absence of the normally 
required consent of the patient (i.e. when there is a serious 
threat to life or health of his patient.) But it is clear 
that a defence of emergency would not be available in the 
transplantation area at least where an action is brought by 
the donor. 
Two fundamental questions have arisen with regard to 
consent by transplant donors -
(a) what is the necessary capacity for a proper 
consent (capacity to give consent in general 
will be discussed in detail later,) and 
(b) what is the permissible extent of consent in 
this area. 
Extent of Consent: 
In this connection it has been suggested that a 
distinction must be drawn between consent for tissue removal 
that will not, and that which will or might be harmful to the 
living donor. ( 29 ) The South African Union Post Mortem Act 
treats the removal of 1tissue replaceable by natural processes of 
repair1 from living donors differently from the removal of 
naturally~replaceable tissue. Under the Act,former class of 
tissue may be freely removed while it allows the removal of 
latter only where the donor consents in writing and 2 other 
physicians certify in writing that the removal will not prejudice 
that person in any way.( 3o) 
The removal of naturally -*'replaceable or repairable 
tissue such as blood transfusions and skin grafts does not 
create much 'problems where proper consent is obtained.( 3l) 
The legal effect of consent by a living donor to the removal 
of tissue not naturally replaceable remains uncertain. 
Can a living donor validly consent to the removal of 
one of his organs for the purpose of transplantation? 
At the ( 32 )same time as the law will not allow consent 
to justify homicide, it is consistent that it will not allow 
the removal from living donors of unpaired vital organs such as 
the liver, lungs and the heart. S.63 of the Crimes Act of 1961 
clearly provides that no person can consent to being killed. 
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To quote Lord Killbrandon( 3~!he law at the moment 
considers that the procedure which the surgeon adopts is so 
severe that it is incapable of being consented to by the person 
being operated on, unless that operation is for the persons own 
benefit. If that is not the law at the moment many people think 
it is •• • • • • . • • . • • • • • .. I 
The ( 34~igh chances of satisfactory existence of one 
kidney probably explairswhy legal liability has not sought to be 
imposed for removal of one of paired organs. Even if loss of one 
kidney involves a slightly increased risk to the donor, most 
have felt that it is clearly outweighed by the need of the 
prospective recipient.( 3 S) 
Question whether a surgeon in N.Z. who removes an organ 
from a live donor guilty of a crimet is to be considered 
J next. 
Bodily harm has been defined in R v Donovan (1934 R.B. 
498, 509) as follows: ?Bodily harm includes any hurt or injury 
calculated to interfere with the health or comfort of the 
prosecutor; such hurt or injury need not be permanent but must 
no doubt be more than merely transient or trifling.t 
Practice of taking blood from donors for purpose of 
blood transfusions is not capable of being legally challenged 
except on religious grounds. But it must be noted that position 
of a blood donor and kidney donor is clearly different in degree 
and it is difficult to categorise blood transfusion procedure 
as anything more than the infliction of bodily harm of a trifling 
or transient nature whereas removal of a kidney is most certainly 
the infliction of harm which is capable of being more than 
transient o~ trifling. 
Thus a surgeon in New Zealand who removes an organ 
from a living donor could be held criminally liable under 188 (1) 
or 188 (2) of the Crimes Act which deals with causing grievous 
bodily harm, even though the donor has freely and knowingly 
consented to the procedure. It is hard to imagine that defence 
under S.61 would be available to a surgeon in the transplantation 
area at least in an action brought by the donor because of the 
lack of benefit to the donor. 
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Important question with regard to live donor transplants 
is not the extent of consent but rather the capacity for consent. 
While a minor as don~ of an organ presents the same legal 
problems as she does in conventional surgical situations (which 
will be discussed later) as a prospective donor he presents more 
complex problems with regard to the potential liability of the 
surgeon. 
At common law minors were incapable of giving consent 
to surgical procedures for the benefit of another. 
Bonner v Moran (126 F 2d 121 D.C. Cir. 1951). When the parents 
consent to a transplant from a minor donor, is the surgeon 
protected thereby from liability? Is the lack of benefit to the 
donor child enough to with-hold protection that results from 
parental consent to surgical procedures on their minor children 
under normal circumstances? 
Three cases from Massachusetts(Jg)appear to shed some 
light on this difficult question. These cases involved kidney 
transplants from 2 sets of identical twins aged 14 and one set of 
19 year old twins. In all three cases children as well as their 
parents or guardians consented. Before proceeding with the 
kidney removal the hospital Trustees in each case sought 
declaratory judgements from Courts. Courts basing their opinion 
on expert medical and psychiatric evidence held that surgeons 
could proceed with the operations on the consent of parents and 
that of both twins wi~•out incurring civil or criminal liability 
A 
finding that the operation was necessary for the continued good 
health and future well-being of the donor twin, for if the 
operation was not performed and the sick twinwereto die this 
would result in a tgrave emotional impactt on the potential donor. 
Court's reliance on the 1benefit1 to the donor, 
diminishes the precedential value of these cases for future 
situations in which no such close relationship between donoi7d donee 
exists or when donor because of extreme youth and mental 
incompetence cannot appreciate the significance of his donative 
act. 
With regard to donors who are closely related to the 
recipient, question frequently asked is whether consent is 
purely informed and voluntary. When donor and donee are closely 
related, there will be much social and psychological pressure on 
those who know that their failure to be a donor will result in 
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the death of the sick person. It is doubtful whether there can
 
ever be informed voluntary consent in situations like this. 
Possible solutions to the problem of consent with 
regard to transplants. 
My submission is that, if live donor transplants are 
going to be of importance in future, legislation is in fact the 
best solution. 
Meyers, C37 )in his book lThe Human Body and the Lawt 
suggests that adults of full capacity, who have been expressly 
advised of all risks involved in the operation, by a physician 
tqe 
not a member of/transplant tea~ should be allowed to consent ~ 
to donate tissue; but only whenAbenefit to be derived by 
recipient of such tissue clearly outweighs the detriment agreed 
to be suffered by the donor. It is clear that such limitation 
would not allow a person to consent to the removal of a vital 
organ resulting in donorls death. But it would not prevent 
a person from consenting to the removal of a kidney, when risk 
involved in the donation is in fair proportion to the benefit 
that is likely to be conferred upon the donee by the transplant. 
He also suggests that difficult borderline cases could be 
referred to Courts for declaratory judgements. It is submitted 
that this type of legislation is desirable rather than legislation
 
prohibiting consent by an individual to medical treatment not 
for his benefit but for the benefit of another. He also suggests
 
that under such legislative formulation children and incompetent 
persons should be excluded and that removal of only naturally 
replaceable tissue (such as blood or skin) from a child should 
be made possible and even then only when the child is of an age 
to understand the nature of his consent, when his parents or 
guardians also have consented and when the donations had been 
authorised by a 2nd physician no way involved in the procedure. 
(X.) COSMETIC OPERATIONS: 
Consent( 3S)to undergo a completely useless operation 
undertaken by a surgeon who knows its uselessness - something 
which in the,fu.edical world is not without precedent is doubtless 
contra bonos mores, whether the operation is performed for purpose
s 
of gain or any other purpose, irrespective of the degree of skill 
with which this operation is performed. Consent to a cosmetic 
operation, it is submitted cannot be considered offensive to good 
morals unless the operation constitutes a threat to the patientis 
life or health. 
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If a ( 39 )person wereto undergo a surgical operation in 
order to improve his facial appearance in some rather trivial 
respect as by remodelling the nose there would be no reason to 
punish either him or the surgeon on the ground of public interest. 
Cosmetic ( 4o)operations might be upheld on the ground that everyone 
is entitled to make himself or herself as attractive as possible. 
It is( 4l)true that consent makes lawful minor non-
therapeutic (cosmetic) operations on the individual, such as 
straightening of teeth, removal of skin blemishes, perforation 
of the ears and tattooing. Even (
4z)serious cosmetic operations 
seems to be justifiable when the object is to remedy a 
detrimental psychological condition of the patient caused by 
unsightly outward appearance (e.g. disfigureing due to cancer 
or an accident.) 
(XI.) WHAT FORM OF CONSENT IS REQUIRED: 
It is always for the defendant to show that consent 
has been given. There are no hard and fast rules as to the 
form of consent which is to be obtained. Consent to surgery 
need not have to be in writing to be valid. As an oral or 
implied consent may be difficult to prove most doctors and 
hospitals prefer a written consent that can be incorporated into 
the permanent record of the patient. 
As a rule express consent whether oral or written is 
not required for minor procedures, consent being implied as an 
aspect of doctor patient relationship, allowing such contact 
as necessary for treatment. In Preston v Hubbel (87 Cal. App. 
2d 53) a patient who consented to the extraction of a tooth was 
held to have impliedly authorised the dentist to repair a fracture 
which was occasioned without negligence, in extracting the tooth. 
In McClees v Cohen (1930, 158 Md 60) in an action against a 
dentist for extracting the wrong teeth the Court said that if the 
patient had gone to the dentist and submitted herself for diagnosis 
with the express or implied request that he do whatever was 
necessary to give her relief, he would only be answerable for 
the lack of proper knowledge, skill and care in the treatment. 
Although consent may be implied in the case of minor operations 
there is no clear guide as to what is a minor procedure and how 
much consent is implied in the acceptance of treatment. However 
it is unlikely tht; a patient who asks a surgeon to treat her is 
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giving an implied consent to perform a major operation without 
further consultation. 
For there to be a legally valid consent the following 
conditions must be satisfied. 
1) The patient must have the legal capacity to give a 
valid consent. 
2) Patient must know substantially to what he is consenting 
i.e. the patientts consent must be educated. 
3) Consent should be granted freely without force or fraud. 
4) Consent given should not be exceeded. (Each of these 
requirements will be discussed in detail.) 
1) Capacity to Consent: 
Adults: The normal adult who is compos mentis can 
give consent himself. A person(
43 )who has attained his majority 
and is of sound mind is presumptively qualified to give or with-
hold consent. The presumption may be rebutted however, by evidence 
showing that when the consent was given the party was drunk, (
44 ) 
under the influence of drugs, ( 4S)delirious or comatose(
46 or 
otherwise incapable of exercising rational judgement. If these 
are the facts law will nevertheless infer consent if the patients 
life was at stake and there was no one present to give consent 
in his behalf. ( 47 ) 
Minors: In the case of children and juveniles, consent 
should be obtained from the parent or guardian and the age of 
16 is established by the legislature as the age of consent and 
it would seem that a distinction must be drawn between minors who 
have attained the age of 16 and ~hose who have not: Under the 
Guardianship Act of 1968 the age of consent is 16. S. 25 of 
Guardianship Act provides - that consent of or refusal to consent 
by a child over the age of 16 years to any dantion of blood or to 
any surgical, medical or dental procedure, shall be valid as if 
the child is of full age. Thus if a child of 16 or over refuses 
treatment to which his parents consent then a doctor will be liable 
to an action in battery, at the suit of the child, if he performs 
treatment. 
Does this section mean that a child over 16 and under 21 
is competent to consent to a major operation, which requires a 
far more matu:e intellect than is required to consent to treatment 
of a minor character without also obtaining the consent of the 
parents or guardian? -~--- Does it also mean tha
t a minor (between 
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16-21) can consent to an operation which is not for his benefit? 
Can a surgeon, who performs an operation not for the minors 
benefit (such as taking a skin graft) rely upon the minorts consent 
as a defence? (The latter question is discussed in detail in 
connection with transplant procedures.) 
My submission is that a surgeon or physician should 
in any event be able to rely upon the childts consent (who is 
above the age of 16 and under 21) as a defence only where he 
performs the operation or administers the treatment in the 
interests of the childts own health. Also I submit that in 
the case of children between that age group, consent of the 
child as well as that of the parent should be made necessary, 
when the operation is of a serious nature. 
When a child is too young to give consent, consent of 
the parents is necessary in almost all situations. S.25 (3) of 
the Guardianship Act specifies who may give consent to operations 
upon their children. Those specified in the section are the 
guardian of the child or if there is no guardian person acting 
as the parent or if there is no such person, a Magistrate or 
the Superintendent of Child Welfare. However, it must be 
stressed neither the consent of the child or his parent or 
guardian is necessary, in an emergency. 
The circumstances may arise, when consent by a parent 
for the transfusion of a child, is unraEonably withheld because 
of religious belief of the parent, that the use of blood for 
therapeutic purposes is wrong. In a situation like this the 
physician would be faced with the problem of a child requiring 
transfusion and parents refusing authority for the use of the 
life mring measure because they belong to the sect of Jehovahts 
Witnesses or some other religion which hold similar views. 
If a doctor proceeds to give the transfusion in such 
circumstances he must risk the legal consequences. He has the 
defence of emergency against a civil action. If the transfusion 
is merely desirable but if there is no immediate danger, then 
tli..s defence of emergency would not be availatile to himo If he 
fails to give blood and the child dies, his fear of a civil 
action would not be accepted as a sufficient duress to make him 
refrain from doing what he knew would probably save the life of 
the child. Case of R v Senior (1899 1 Q.B. 283) would show 
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I 
the laws attitude towards parents who deny their children
 
necessary medical treatment on religious grounds. In t
his case 
the child died through such neglect and father was convic
ted of 
manslaughter. 
If the patient is at home and under the control of the 
parent it will be difficult to give him necessary treatme
nt. 
It is clear in such circumstances a parent's refusal to c
onsent 
to a transfusion run contrary to the parental duty at com
mon law 
to protect and care for their children. In England the o
nly 
course open was to make an application by the Local Autho
rity 
under S.62 of Children and Young Persons Act 1933 to have
 the 
child removed from his parents control as being in need o
f care 
and protection. Although the is not a purpose envisaged
 by 
the 6hildren and Young Persons Act in England it has been
 adopted 
as a life saving measure. 
In the United States1 many Sta
tes have statutes which 
authorise the Juvenile Courts to order necessary medical 
and 
surgical careJif parent or guardian refuses to provide it
 for 
a minor child. e.g. treatments and procedures such as bloo
d 
transfusions and straightening of legs have been ordered b
y 
Courts. The attitude of the Courts in America is well
 summed 
up by the United States Supreme Court in Prince v Commonw
ealth 
(321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)) as follows -
1 parents may be free to 
become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow tha
t they are 
free in identical circumstances to make martyrs of their c
hildren 
before they reach the age of full and legal discretion, w
hen they 
can make the choice for themselves.' 
The question to be considered here is whether a doctor 
in New Zealand who administers a transfusion under such ci
rcumstance 
would be protected from civil or criminal liability by S.1
26 (B) 
of the Health Act 1956. 
It is clear that this provision gives protection to a 
medical practitioner {for administering a blood transfusio
n to 
a minor without the consent of those whose consent is requ
ired 
by law) only 
1) if the doctor forms a reasonable opinion that the 
transfusion is necessary to save the life of the 
patient .. j_n the circumstance$ , 126 (b) (3) a, and 
reasonable attempts were made to get such consent 
S.S. ( 3) b i or 
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it was impracticable in the circumstances to g
et such 
consent S.S. (3) b ii, and it was reasonable in 
the 
circumstances. 
However, it is clear in a situation like this,
 that a 
doctor will not be in a position to satisfy th
e condition 
required under S.S.3 (b) because it is apparen
t that the parents 
are available and that they have refused to co
nsent to the 
transfusion. 
Finally with regard to minors the question ari
ses, whether 
a doctor, who performs an operation on a minor
 with consent of a 
person whom he bona fide believe~s to be the g
uardian or to have 
sufficient authroity from the guardian, is pro
tected from liability. 
There is no direct decision on this point. T
he 
American case of Rishworth v Moss (1913 159 S.W
. 122) gives an 
indication of the attitude the Courts may adop
t. In this case, 
a child of 11 years who was sent by her parent
s to spend a holiday 
with her 2 unmarried sisters was operated for 
removal of her 
tonsils and adenoidso American Courts dealing
 with the question 
according to strict principles of law of Agenc
yJaad held that a 
surgeon could rely upon the girlsl consent to 
the operation only 
if the parents had either given actual authroi
ty to the girls to 
consent on their behalf or has conducted thems
elves in such a way 
as to make tresurgeon believe that the girls h
ad their authority 
to consent. In reality no actual authority h
ad been given and 
Courts held that the fact that parents permitt
ed the child to 
visit the sisters could not justify the surgeo
n in inferring 
that authority had been given to them to conse
nt to such a serious 
operation. Thus . it is clear from this decisio
n that a doctor 
I 
will be protected by the consent of a person o
ther than the 
guardian only if that person had actual author
ity (whether given 
expressly or by implication) from th~ardian 
to consent to such 
an operation or has been placed by the guardia
n in such a position 
as to justify the doctor in believing that the
 authority has been 
given. 
But if a person induces a doctor to operate on
 a minor 
child by representing that he was the infantts
 guardian then in 
such a case the doctor should have a remedy ag
ainst that person 
who induced him. 
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Persons of Unsound Mind: 
A mentally ill person may or may not be able t
o give a 
valid consent to treatment depending on his m
ental state. 
If a person is compulsorily admitted for treatm
ent 
(under S.25 of Mental Health Act) consent of th
e patient is not 
required and the consent of the Medical Superi
ntendent who has 
custody of the patient will be sufficient for 
purpose of medical 
treatment. If the patient is voluntarily adm
itted then consent 
of the patient is required to any treatment, a
s if he were a 
patient in an ordinary hospital and a child wh
o is over 16 years 
of age who is capable of expressing his own wi
shes may make such 
arrangement with the Superintendent for treatm
ent notwithstanding 
any objections from his parents or guardianso 
What is the position with regard to mental pat
ients who 
are not in hospital or those admitted for obse
rvation who are 
not capable of understanding the nature of tre
atment or the effect 
of consent? 
The legal position is that the doctor must obt
ain the 
consent of the nearest relative. However, it 
must be noted that 
Stephents Digest of the Criminal Law(
4S)contains the following 
submission that if 11 a person is in such circum
stances as to be 
inapable of giving consent to a surgical oper
ation •••••o it is 
not a crime to perform such an operation •••••
•••• without his 
consent or in spite of his resistance." 
A problem which does not appear to have been d
ealt with 
in any of the English or American cases is whe
ther upon the 
incapacity of one spouse, his or her rights of
 giving consent 
automatically passes to the other spouseo Wo
uld the doctor be 
liable if he• operates without the spousets co
nsent? 
In the American case of Pratt v Davis ((1905) 
118 Ill 
app. 161) a similar problem arose. However, 
it does not provide 
a conclusive answer to the question. The def
endant operated on 
the plaintiffts wife for removal of her uterus
 and ovaries without 
consent and the husband sued the doctor on beh
alf of the insane 
wife. Defendant alleged that the plaintiff was i
nsane at the 
time of the operation and that he obtained the
 husbandts consent. 
d..... tt... 
However Court found that husband had not conse
nted and gave 
I ~ 
judgement for the plaintiff. In the Appellat
e Court - deliveringlf...c 
judgement Brown J. pointed out that he entert
ained some doubt 
as to the correctness of the assumption that 
the wife being insane 
and there being no other legally appointed gu
ardian the husband 
was solely in control of her person. 
However 1 Nethan(
49 ) thinks,in such circumstances proper 
inference to be drawn from the relationship o
f husband and ,ife 
is that each gives to the other an implied au
thority to grant or 
withhold consent. 
Spouses: 
Where a patient is married it is not legally 
necessar-
to obtain the consent of the spouse provided 
the patient is of 
sound mind and conscious. In Rosenberg v Fei
gn (1953 119 Cal. 
App. 2d 783) where a physician was held not li
able to the husband 
of a woman whom he had treated with her conse
nt, though the 
treatment resulted in a miscarriage. 
Where an operation is medically necessary for
 the wife 
husband cannot prevent the operation by withh
olding his consent. 
Janey v Housekeeper (70 MD 162 16 A 3 2 (18 9
)). 
Therefore we may conclude that neither spouse
 can 
complain that his or her rights have been infr
inged by the 
performance of an operation on the other if th
e operation was 
) ' 
performed with the patients consent and was p
erformed bona fide in 
the interests of the patient on medical groun
ds. 
However, in some circumstances, consent of bo
th spouses 
must be obtained before an operation is perfor
med on one of them, 
i.e. a doctor could be held liable in damages 
for operating upon 
a spouse who is capable of consenting and doe
s consent iD the 
operation, if the consent of the other spouse 
has not ban secured 
to the operation. 
A doubtful issue is in the case of an illegal 
operation 
(abortion or sterilisation) to which the wife 
has consented. It 
is submitted that in these circumstances the h
usband could sue for 
loss of his wifets services, since the operat
ion is wrongful, 
despite the wifets consent and the wifets con
sent only bars her 
action and not her husband's completely separ
ate claim. However, 
a wife has no corresponding claim in respect 
of a loss of her 
husband's society. Best v Samuel Fox (1952 AC
 716). 
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However, Nethan( 5o)thinks that an action should lie in respect 
of a loss of consortium only when the husband is deprived of all 
the rights which together make up the consortium and that no action 
lies therefore when consortium has merely been impaired by reasons 
of some interference with the wifels sexual capacityi. 
2) Knowledge of the plaintiff, i.e. Patientts consent must 
be leducatedl. 
If a doctor or sugeon obtains consent to treatment by 
concealing dangers inherent in the treatment he may become liable 
in battery because the apparent consent he obtained is not a real 
consent. He may also become liable in negligence, for breach of 
his duty towards his patient, if a patient can prove that the 
nature of the treatment was not explained to him and that a reason-
able doctor using the skill of his profession would have given 
him the information he lacked. In the case of Smith v Auckland 
Hospital Board (1965 N.Z.L.R. 191 (C.A.) the doctor failed to 
answer the questions put to him by the patient as to the risks 
involved in the procedure recommended by him and as a result of 
submitting to treatment the patient suffered a surgical mishapo 
The Court of Appeal reversing the judgement of Woodhouse J. in 
the S.C. held the particular relationship of doctor and patient is 
sufficient to impose upon the doctor a duty to use due care in 
answering a question put to him by the patient where the patient, 
to the knowledge of the doctor intends to place reliance on that 
answer in making a decision as to a treatment to which he is 
asked to consent. Hedley Byrne and Co. Ltd. v Heller and Partners 
~ (1964 AC 465) applied. 
The Court further held 1 that if in answering such a 
question the doctor fails to use due care and as a result of 
submitting to the proposed treatment the patient suffers injuries, 
the doctor will be liable to the patient in neglig ence if the 
evidence shows that it is probable that if a proper answer had been 
given patient would have refused to undergo treatment. 
Thus
1
in an action in negligence plaintiff must show 
that he suffered damage and he must also prove that if he had 
knowiwhat was involved in the treatment he would not have consented. 
However l in an action in battery although it is not necessary 
to prove damage plaintiff must prove that he was materially 
deceived about the nature of the operation. 
Even though a patient signs a written consent he may not 
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always be held to it, when he did not 
know or understand to 
what he was consenting. The English 
Medica1( 5l)Defence Union 
Booklet states "It is essential that th
e nature and the effect 
of the operation are explained to the 
patient. Unless this is 
done he may afterwards repudiate the c
onsent form on the ground 
that he did not fully understand the d
ocument which he signed. 11 
When the patient signs a consent form 
the onus is usually on 
him to show that he was deceived. 
Courts in other jurisdictions have been
 placed in the 
position of having to decide the quest
ion whether the consent 
should be binding when the patient doe
s not consciously weigh 
the risks of undergoing treatment agai
nst risks of foregoing 
treatment. A patientls decision to u
ndergo the treatment in spite 
of the risks inherent in the treatment 
is the product of 
tinformed consentt. However,the avera
ge patient's ignorance 
of medical science very likely make him
 unaware of particular 
risks inherent in a proposed treatment 
and hence prevents him 
from giving the informed consent which 
the law requires. 
Informed consent therefore concerns the
 extent to which a doctor 
must disclose risks inherent in a prop
osed method of tre:tment. 
It is necessary at this point to examin
e how the Courts 
in other jurisdictions have approached 
the problem. In the 
]JEt decade the American Courts have ev
olved several standards 
for the degree of education to be given
 a patient before he 
can be said to ha~gn/4,ented to the surge
ry or treatment. In 
some of the cases Courts have followed 
the professional standard 
in determining whether there was a duty
 to disclose a given risk. 
In Salago v Leland Stanford Jr. Univer
sity Bd. of Trustees 
(154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578) the Califor
nia Court stated a strict 
standard for the degree of education to
 be given a patient before 
he can be said to have consented. 
tA physician violates his duty to his p
atient and 
subjects himself to liability if he wi
thholds any facts which 
are necessary to form the basis of an i
ntelligent consent by the 
patient to the proposed treatment,an<;l L
ikewise the physician may 
not minimize the known dangers of a pro
cedure or operation in 
order to induce his patientts consent •
••••• patient's mental 
and emotional condition is important an
d in certain cases may be 
crucial and that in discussing the elem
ent of risk, a certain 
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amount of discretion must be employed consistent with the
 full 
disclosure of facts necessary to an informed consent.t 
Although Courts of other States too have stated the 
principle that the patient must have knowledge of what he
 consents 
to, they do not require such a strict standard as the Cal
ifornia 
Court requires. American Courts have on the whole preferred 
to 
treat 1 informed consentl cases as actions in negligence r
ather 
than battery. In the American case of Bowers v Talm .age
 and 
Vonstorch (1963 So 2d, 888, 889) where a 9 year old boy w
ho 
suffered from hallucinations was taken to a neurologist w
ho 
recommended an arteriogram an exploratory process (in whi
ch 3% 
of the cases were known to result in serious injury) who 
was in 
doubt as to whether the childls trouble was emotional or 
organic. 
However, the defendant did not explain the risks involved
 in the 
treatment -to the childls parents and they gave their conse
nt. 
Also,there was no emergency requiring the operation. As 
a 
consequence of the treatment plaintiff was partly paralyse
d. 
Court held on appeal 1 unless a person who gives consent to
 an 
operation knows its dangers and the degree of danger, a c
onsent 
does rot represent a choice and is ineffectual.I 
In this case Court observed that the doctors primary 
duty is to do what is best for the patient and any confli
ct 
between that duty and that of making a frightening disclos
ure 
ordinarily should be resolved in favour of the primary dut
yo 
In Watson v Cluffs (136 S.E. 2d 617 (1964)) the doctor 
told the patient that she would have to stay in the hospi
tal for 
a week before the serious operation. She suffered paraly
sis of 
both vocal cords as a result of the operation and had to h
ave a 
tracheotomy. The plaintiff lost in this case on the infor
med 
consent theory. The North Carolina Court stated tthe type
 of 
risk involved should have a bearing on the completeness o
f the 
disclosure required ••••••• But a surgeon except in emergen
cy, 
should make a reasonable disclosure of the risk involved •
•.•••• 
if the operation involved known risks/ 
In Mitchell v Robinson (79 AL R 2d 1017 (1960)) the 
plaintiff underwent insulin shock treatment for severe dep
ression 
and anxiety complicated by alcoholism. He consented orall
y to 
the treatment. Although it was not immediately necessary
 to 
save his life it was carried out by qualified doctors with
out 
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neglig n e. In the course of the treatmen-c plaintiff s
uff red 
f t d t b d 
. 1 .tho
ugh1' 
bl 
rac ure ,-er rae, uring a con,-u sion, aI reasona 
precautions had been taken to prevent this. Plaintiff br
ought 
-tlis action on the ground that he had not been inform d o
f th 
risks and dangers involved in the treatment and that do 
tor- had 
been negligent in not giving this inforrnatim In this ca
s 
medical evidence was given that shock therapy carried a 
high 
risk of fracture - one doctor assessed it at 1 ( . The Cour
t 
held in the circumstances the physician had a legal duty
 to 
inform the patient of any serious risk of collat ral inju
ry 
arising from any new and radical procedure he might pre-
cribe 
and that a prima facie cause of action in negligenc Kas 
established. 
In another American case Yeats ,- Harms (10" Kan 
320, 327) the Court affirmed a jury verdict for def ndant, 1her 
injury complained of (i.e. loss of an eye du to inf ctio
n 
following cataract surgery) was from a risk not disclos 
d. 
The defendant testified that such results occurred in l½
~ of h 
cases he treated. According to the Kansas Court - th -
,ill 
not textend the duty of a physician or surgeon to the ex
trem 
when he would have to appraise his patient not only of th
 
known risks but also of each infinitesimal, imaginati,-e 
or 
speculative:,klement that would go into making up such risk
s.I 
It would appear from the foregoing cases that the 
requirement of informed consent ~'4.~ applied most strictl
y, when 
a Court feels that the procedure involved is so new or so
 radical 
that the patient should be given adtuate explanation to 
nabl ,. 
him to decide whether he would rather forego the treatmen
t than 
submit to the risk. 
English Approach: 
In a recent English case Bolam v Frier~ Hospital 
Management Committee (1957 1 WLR 582) a patient suffered a 
fracture of the pelvis while undergoing electric convulsi
on 
treatment . He brought an action for negligence a
nd breach of 
duty alleging that he was not given his warning of the ri
sks 
involved in the treatment . In this case McNair J . directed 
the 
jury as follows IMembers of the jury, though it is 
a matter 
entirely for you, you may well think that when dealing w
ith a 
mentally sick man and having a strong belief that his on
ly hope 
of cure is E. C. T. treatment, a doctor cannot be criticise
d, if 
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he does not stress the dangers which he be
lieves to be minimal 
involved in that treatment.I He also adv
ised them that the 
plaintiff had to satisfy them that he wou
ld not have taken the 
treatment, if he had been warned, as other
wise the lack of warning 
made no difference to his position and cau
sed him no damage. 
The jury found for the defendants. Howev
er, this case could be 
distinguished from the American case of sh
ock treatment discussed 
above, !Where the plaintiff recovered dam
ages, because in the 
English case the patient was mentally ill 
and shock treatment was 
the only cure. The risk of fracture in t
he English case was one 
in 10,000 whereas it was put at 18% in the
 American case. The 
doctor was held justified in not advising 
him of the risks which 
would only have made him apprehensive. 
In another English case Hatcher v Black (1954
 The Times 
July 2nd) where a surgeon was held not to 
have been qegligent 
in failing to warn a nervous patient of a 
slight risk to her vocal 
cord, involved in an operation for a toxic
 goitre. In this case 
the doctor told the patient the possible a
lternative treatment -
namely an operation or medical treatment b
y drugs and pointed out 
that treatment of drugs would take a long 
time. Patient chose 
the operation and in the course of the ope
ration her left laryngeal 
nerve was injured and the left vocal cord
 was paralysed. Denning 
L.J. in his summing up to the jury said tW
hat should a doctor 
tell a patient? - The surgeon has admitted
 that on the evening 
before the operation he told the plaintiff
 that there was no 
risk to her voice when he knew that there 
was some slight risk 
but t hat he did it for her own good, becau
se it was of vital 
importance that she should not worry •••••
•• he told a lie but 
he did it because in the circumstances it 
was justifiable •••• 
But the law does not condemn a doctor when
 he only does what a 
wise doctor so placed would do.t 
favour of the defendants. 
Jury returned a verdict in 
What conclusions can be drawn from these c
ases, as to 
the extent of medical mans duty towards th
e patients to disclose 
risks so as to elicit an informed consent~
 
It appears from these cases that English C
ourts are 
more ready to accept a surgeonts opinion t
hat a patient ought 
not to be told than the American Courts. 
Howeve~ it should be 
noted that this deprives the patient of hi
s right to decide 
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what should happen to him. It 
is submitted that the laws stro
ng 
predisposition towards personal
 control over bodily invasion h
as 
been violated by the current ju
dicial treatment of informed 
consents and that it encourages
 medical men in their conspirac
y 
of silence. The lawk predispo
sition towards patientls rights
 
could be more effectively serve
d if the problem were treated in
 
the following manner. 
i.e. A surgeon should be under 
an obligation to make a 
full disclosure of all known m
aterial risks in a proposed ope
ration 
or course of treatment except f
or those risks of which the pa
tient 
is likely to know (i.e. risks t
hat are common to all the oper
ations 
e.g. risk of infection during m
ajor surgery or risks involved 
in 
anaesthesia etc.). But if the
 doctor makes any lesser disclo
sure 
then he must prove the reasonab
leness of such disclosure or th
e 
immateriality of the undisclose
d risk. 
Some patients may not want to k
now the risks and would 
prefer to entrust themselves to
 the doctors best judgement. 
While such patients do exist it
 cannot be assumed that all pat
ients 
feel that way. Therefore a doc
tor should proceed on the assum
ption 
that a patient wishes to know t
he risks unless in response to 
an 
offer of disclosure, he decline
s or delegates his decision to 
the 
doctor. Under the above menti
oned proposed standard there w
ould 
be 3 defences available to the 
doctor when a plaintiff alleges
 
that there was a failure to inf
orm the risks involved in the 
proposed treatment and that he 
would have refused to consent h
ad 
he known the risks. 
1) The physiciants first d
efence would be the immateriali
ty 
of the risk. The doctor can a
ccomplish this by showing throu
gh 
expert testimony that the risk 
was so minor or infrequent that
 
knowledge of the risk was not e
ssential to an intelligent cons
ent 
or was so difficult to explain 
that it would place an unreason
able 
burden upon him to inform every
 patient the risk. 
2) Secondly1 a doctor 
could prove that he was not and
 
should not have been aware of t
he risk. If the risks are not 
known, there should be no liabi
lity for failure to disclose, 
) 
unless physicians lack of knowl
edge of the risk was itself 
negligent, 
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or thirdly, a physician could prove that the patient
1 s 
mental or emotional condition was such that it would have been 
therapeutically unwise to inform the risk. But safer course 
for physicians, when disclosure should not be made for the 
benefit of the patient would be, to disclose the risks to the 
responsible relatives. In Lester v Aetna Cas. and S~r. Co. 
(240 F2d 676, 679 (1957)) it was held that an adequate disclosure 
of the risks in shock therapy to the wife of the patient was 
sufficient. In this case wife and physician had agreed that 
it would be best not to frighten the patient by disclosure of the
 
risks. 
3) Consent must be freely granted and must not be obtain
ed 
by force or fraud. 
If a doctor obtains consent by force or fraud then 
patientts apparent consent to the operation or tra:tment will 
afford no defence to an action for assault. To represent to 
a patient that an operation is necessary to save life or to 
preserve the health when that is not the case or to indicate 
that it will give greater relief than there is any reasonable 
prospect of obtaining is to perpetrate a fraud on the patient 
which vitiates ( 5z)consent. However,fraud vitiates consent 
only if it relates to the substance of the treatment. In Hobbs 
v Kizen (1966 236F 681) consent given by the patient was 
vitiated when the doctor performed an abortion on her under 
the pretence that he was operating for an abscess on the womb. 
4) Consent must not be exceeded. 
A medical man who goes outside the scope of the consent 
which has been expressly or impliedly given is liable to the 
patient for an assault; just as a doctor who operates on a 
patient without his consent. 
A heavily litigated area in medical-surgical consent is 
the situation when the physician extends the treatment beyond 
that which is specifically authorised. As in the cases (discu
ssed 
in connection with the defence of emergency) the existing danger 
to the life or health of the patient is often the determining 
factor. Thus,where consent to a certain operation has 
been 
given and in the operation serious conditions not to be anticipate
d 
are discovered endangering the life or health of a patient, the 
surgeon is justified in extending the operation 
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to remove such conditions. 
See Mohr v Williams ((1905) 104 N.W.) 
In another American case Tabor v Scobee (254 
S.W. 2d 
474) a physician performing a caesarean operat
ion tied off the 
patientts fallopian tubes in order to preclude
 a second pregnancy 
when he found tumours which he felt might be d
angerous in the 
event of such pregnancy. It was held that he
 was liable for -assaulty t he Court holding 1 that there was no emergency 
immediately threatening the life or health, po
inted out that the 
fact that it was more convenient to perform th
e operation at that 
time rather than later after a consultation wi
th the patient did 
not justify the action, even though the operat
ion was skilful 
and not negligently performed. However, in th
e Canadian case of 
Marshall v Curry (1933 DLR 260) the doctor eng
aged to perform a 
hernia operation was held to have been justife
d in removing the 
plaintiffls testicle when in the course of the
 operation he 
found conditions which indicated that removal 
was required not 
only to repair the hernia but also to protect 
the patientls life 
and healtho 
In the recent American cases, there is a tende
ncy to 
evolve a test of general consent to deal with 
these cases because 
it is thought that surgeons should be given som
e latitude in 
operations as to not unduly restrict them when
 an obvious danger 
may be extinguished by an extension of the pre
sent operation. 
A case in which the application of the new tes
t can be seen is 
Kennedy v Parrot (1956 243 NC 355). 
The rule is that a patientts consent to an ope
ration 
in the absence of proof to the contrary lwill 
be construed as 
general in nature and the surgeon may extend th
e operation to 
remedy any abnormal or diseased condition in th
e area of original 
incision, when ever, he in the exercise of his
 sound professional 
judgement determines that correct surgical pro
cedure dictates and 
' 
requires such an extension of the operation or
iginally contemplated~ 
Kloss( 53 )says that the recent trend in America
n Courts 
is an extension of the emergency principle to 
cases, where, 
though no emergency exists, it is reasonable fo
r the surgeon 
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to remedy a condition without asking further p
ermission, i.e. 
surgeon is only liable for exceeding consent w
hen he does so 
unreasonably and so negligently. In this case
 surgeon while 
performing an appendectomy discovered cysts on
 patientls ovary 
and although no emergency existed cCIBidering t
hem a potential 
source of danger pundured them. Patient devel
oped phlebitis 
and plaintiff claimed that it was caused by th
e unauthorised 
puncture. The Court held that the surgeon was
 not liable 
as he had taken all reasonable care nor was he
 liable in battery 
for 1 where an internal operation is indicated 
a surgeon may 
lawfully perform and it is his duty to perform
 such operation 
as good surgery demands, even where it means a
n extension of 
the operation further than was originally cont
emplated and for 
so doing he is not to be held liable in damage
s as for an 
unauthorised operation.I 
However , it must be noted that the rule depends
 on 
general consent being implied. Therefore if 
the patient 
expressly forbade the surgeon to exceed the c
onsent, he will 
be liable in battery if he disregards the inst
ruction. 
In Marshall v Harter (262 S.W. 2d 180 ~y 1953)
) the patient 
submitting to the examination had told the doc
tor there was 
to be no cutting. The doctor claimed that 
he explained that 
the examination would not be complete unless a
 biopsy was 
obtained and the patient had consented to that
. The Court 
held that the patient had a G~e of action i
f he so told the 
doctor even if the doctorts act was good medic
al judgement 
and the plaintiff suffered no permanent or sev
ere harm. This is 
why writers say that Beatty v Cullingworth (18
96 B.M.J. 1546) 
the only English case on the subject was wrong
ly decided. In 
this case although the patient instructed the 
surgeon not,to 
remove both ovaries, surgeon found both ovarie
s diseased 
(during the operation) and removed both. It w
as held that it 
was legally justified. 
However> a physician should carefully consider 
any 
extension of an operation specially where the 
result will deprive 
the patient of the possibility of having child
ren. In such cases 
surgeon should undertake such procedures witho
ut consent, only 
if the patientts condition makes it necessary 
for preservation 
of her life and health and not merely because 
it is advisable. 
Therefore in conclusion it can be said that th
e surgeon 
may operate without prior authorization if an 
emergency demands 
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it or if it is reasonable in the circumstances for 
him to go 
beyond express or implied consent of the patient (e
xcept where 
reproductive function of the parties are concerned.
) 
(XIIo) CONCLUSIONS: 
Consent to medical treatment may be implied by lyin
g 
on the examination couch, baring the arm for inject
ion or by 
submitting to the preparation for operation. But 
it would be 
unreasonable to expect a physician to obtain the pa
tientts 
written consent to the thousands of minor medical p
rocedures 
which are carried out daily in hospitals. But if a
 major surgical 
operation is contemplated it should be the universa
l practice 
to insist on written consent to the proposed proced
ure provided 
that a patient is in a condition to give it. 
Saving the life of the patient should always be the
 
paramount consideration and in an emergency doctor 
should take 
such steps however drastic as he considers necessar
y (to save 
the life of the patient) without being hampered by 
the delay 
in obtaining the consent of a relative, when the pa
tient is a 
child or unconscious. 
The age of 16 is established by the Legislature of 
New Zealand as the age of consent and under the age
 of 16 excepting 
in emergency the consent of the parent or guardian 
must always 
be sought. The capacity of a mentally subnormal p
erson should 
be qualified by the degree of understanding; if he can
 comprehend (---~ 
the proposed procedure then there need be no referen
ce to his 
relatives. The same should apply to a mentally il
l person. 
With a compulsorily detained patient1 no consent oth
er than that 
of the person responsible for her treatment of the 
mental 
condition is required although it is wise to commun
iq_ate with 
relatives when it is possible. If capacity to giv
e consent 
is temporarily impaired by drink or drugs the docto
r should be 
allowed to use his own judgement as to the extent o
f his 
treatment, confining this to measures to save life 
or prevent 
serious permanent damage until patient is in a cond
ition to 
appreciate what is to be done. 
Then as to the degree of education to be given a 
patient before he can be said to have consented to 
the trat-ment 
the standard proposed above (when discussing this) 
should be 
observed by the doctors. 
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With regard to married couples in general, the 
spouse has no right to interfere with the treatment of his 
or her partner. But I think it is wise to put the other 
in the picture, unless the patient expressly forbids this. 
If there is to be interference with reproductive function as 
when the womb is to be removed or a vasectomy operation is 
to be performed, both partners must be fully appraised of the 
situation and both should be required to give written consent. 
(This is the practice followed in New Zealand hospitals.) 
Except in emergency written consent to operation or 
anaesthetic should always be obtained. These should be 
retained with the clinical records of the patient. It is 
also important that signature should be countersigned by the 
surgeon in charge after the explanation of the procedure; 
the practice of asking a patient to sign an incompleted form 
like a blank cheque, on admission to the hospital before exact 
nature of the operation has been settled is reprehensible. 
If it is impomble to forecast the extension of an operation 
until it has been commenced the patient should be warned and 
sanction obtained to such measures as may reasonably be 
expected to become necessary. 
It is hoped that the examination of the practice 
followed in other jurisdictions with regard to medical 
responsibility in this respect might be found of interest 
and use in the medico-legal practice in New Zealand. 
. . . . . . . . . . . 
FOOTNOTES: 
(1) Ethics in Medical Progress P.82 
(2) Consent to Medical Treatment - Diana M. Kloss 5 
Medicine Science and the Law. P.92 
(3) Lord Devlin - Samples of Law Making P.87 
(4) Lord Devlin - Samples of Law Making P.89 
(5) Salmond and Torts 11th edn. P.42 
(6) Windfield - Province of the Law of Tort. P.86-91 
(7) D.W. Meyers - The Human Body and the Law P.1. 
(8) 26 M.L.R. 232 
(9) Gordon - Criminal Law of Scotland P.351 
(10) Quoted from 1970 N.Z.M.J. 230 
(11) Samples of Law Making P.94 
(12) 1966, British Medical Journal 1, P.1597 
(13) Gordon - Criminal Law of Scotland P.775 
(14) D.W. Meyers - The Human Body and the Law P.15 
(15) Williams Sanctity of Life P.106 
(16) See Ward v Ward 1958 1 WLR 693; Forbes v Forbes 
1955 1 WLR 531 
(17) 81 S.A.L.J. 1964 P. 191 (S.A. Strauss) 
(18) Obtained from the Wellington Hospital 
(19) 1970 N.Z.M.J. P.231 
(20) Adams - Criminal Law and Practice in N.Z. 
(1964 ed.) P.129 
(21) Glanville Williams - Consent and Public Policy 
1962 C.L.R. 159 
(22) Professor G.P. Barton - Legal Aspects of Transsexualism 
and Sex Re-assignment P.17 
(23) It appears from the judgement of Omrod J. in 
Corbett v Corbett 1970 2 WLR 
1306 1318 
(24) Reported in the Argentina Law Journal and commented 
upon exclusively by S.A. Strauss in 84 S.A.L.J. 1967 
P. 214 
(25) Meyers - The Human Body and the Law P.66 
(26) Transsexualism 1971 Cornell Law Review Vol. 56 P.974 
(27) Professor Barton - Legal Aspects of Transsexualism 
and Sex Re-assignment P.1 8 
(28) Professor Barton - P.19 
(29) Meyers - P.121 
(30) Meyers - P.122 
(31) Forbes - Legal Aspects of Blood Transfusion and 
therapy in@neral - 4 Medicine Science and the 
Law (1964) P.26 
(32) Meyers - 122 
(33) Ethics in Medical Progress - 214 
FOOTNOTES (contd.) 
(34) Shapiro - Organ Grafting in Man 14 Journal for Med. 
41 (1967) 
(35) Danbe - Ethics in Medical Progress 195 
(36) These cases have not been officially reported but 
have been discussed by Curran in N.Y. 34 U.L.R. 891 
(37) Meyers - 132 
(38) 81 S.A.L.J. 1964 P.189 
(39) 
(40) 
(41) 
1962 
1962 
S1 
C.L.R. 
C.L.R. 
S.A.L.J. 
155 
157 
344 
(42) 81 S.A.L.J. P.189 
(43) Meek v City of Loveland 85 Colo. 346 
(44) Barker v Heaney 82 S.W. 2d 417 
(45) Wheeler v Barker 92 Cal. App. 2d 776 
(46) Arbalo v Nealson 73 Cal. App. 2d 545 
(47) Stetler and Moritz - Doctor, Patient and the Law P.134 
(48) Stephens - Digest of Criminal Law - 6th ed. (1904) 
164 Art. 226 
(49) Nethan - Medical Negligence 169 
(50) Nethan - Medical Negligence P.181 
(51) 5 Medicine, Science and the Law P.92 
(52) Stetler and Moritz - P.134. Doctor, Patient ~nd the Law 
(53) 5 Medicine Science and the Law P.100 
. . . . . . . . . 
. . ~ . 
. . ~ .. 
. . . . . . . . 
LIBRARY 
Conoent to cdical. 
nd surgical proce-
·uros. 
327,744 
WIN 51;/'lr 
-- - -- - ----"t...J..J.--.l-~-----+--1 
LfAS~:~R~:N, ~T . 
1 4 FEI 1988 J .. 
W.U. tNTERL0,\1''S \ 
,....,__-:-- -------_____ .--i 
.,. 
~. old. ;r ,. 

